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Note 
GRIFFIN v. STATE: SETTING THE BAR TOO HIGH FOR 
AUTHENTICATING SOCIAL MEDIA EVIDENCE 
BRENDAN W. HOGAN∗
In Griffin v. State,
 
1 the Court of Appeals of Maryland found that a 
printout from a MySpace page, offered to demonstrate that a witness 
had been threatened into providing inaccurate testimony at an earlier 
trial, was not properly authenticated at trial because, despite the fact 
that the printout contained identifying characteristics the lower 
courts found sufficient for authentication,2 the risk of “manipula-
tion . . . by someone other than [the] purported creator and/or user” 
was too great to allow the printout into evidence.3  This holding im-
properly distinguished social media evidence from other forms of 
electronic evidence and suggested an artificially high authentication 
threshold for social media evidence presented at trial.4  The court fur-
ther erred in creating a higher standard for authentication of social 
media evidence by stating a non-exclusive list of three means for au-
thentication, because neither the plain text of the Maryland Rules of 
Evidence nor traditional authentication procedures support such a 
system.5
 
Copyright © 2012 by Brendan W. Hogan. 
  The court should have affirmed the lower court ruling that 
the evidence was admissible because the prosecution met its burden 
of proof and showed that the evidence was what it was purported to 
∗ Brendan Hogan is a second-year student at the University of Maryland Francis King 
Carey School of Law, where he is a staff member of the Maryland Law Review.  He wishes to 
thank his wife, Nora-Anne Hogan, son, Declan Michael Hogan, family, and friends for 
their continued love and support.  He also wishes to thank Chief Magistrate Judge Paul W. 
Grimm for his invaluable insight and suggestions in writing this Note, and his editors 
Lindsey N. Lanzendorfer, Kristina V. Foehrkolb, D. Jack Blum, Molly K. Madden, Esther R. 
Houseman, and Stephen Kiehl.  
 1. 419 Md. 343, 19 A.3d 415 (2011).   
 2. Griffin v. State, 192 Md. App. 518, 544, 995 A.2d 791, 807 (2010), rev’d, 419 Md. 
343, 19 A.3d 415 (2011). 
 3. Griffin, 419 Md. at 348, 357–58, 19 A.3d at 418, 424. 
 4. See infra Part IV.A.  
 5. See infra Part IV.B. 
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be; the defense offered no evidence to rebut this presumption.6
I.  THE CASE  
 
Early in the morning of April 24, 2005, Darvell Guest was shot 
seven times in the women’s bathroom of Ferrari’s Bar in Perryville, 
Maryland.7  Antoine Levar Griffin was charged with the murder and 
subsequently tried for the first time in August 2006.8  At the first trial, 
Griffin’s cousin, and an eyewitness to the murder, Dennis Gibbs, “tes-
tified that [he] did not see [Griffin] pursue the victim into the bath-
room with a gun.”9  The first trial ended in a mistrial and Griffin was 
retried in January 2008.10
At the second trial, Gibbs testified again.
   
11  This time, however, 
other witnesses stated that Griffin did pursue Guest into the bathroom 
and Gibbs testified that Griffin and Guest were the only other indi-
viduals in the bathroom at the time the shots were fired.12  Gibbs 
stated that he lied in the first trial because he had been threatened by 
Griffin’s girlfriend, Jessica Barber, before the start of the first trial.13
To prove that Barber had threatened Gibbs before the first trial, 
the prosecution offered a printout from a MySpace profile page alle-
gedly belonging to Barber.
   
14  The page contained the statement: 
“JUST REMEMBER, SNITCHES GET STITCHES!! U KNOW WHO 
YOU ARE!!”15  The State introduced this evidence to corroborate 
Gibbs’s contention that he had been threatened.16  The MySpace pro-
file was in the name of “SISTASOULJAH,” but the State contended 
that it belonged to Ms. Barber.17  The printout contained biographi-
cal data indicating that the author was a 23-year-old female from Port 
Deposit, Maryland, and listing the individual’s birthday as “10-2-83.”18
 
 6. See infra Part IV.B.1. 
  
 7. Griffin, 192 Md. App. at 523, 995 A.2d at 794.   
 8. Id.  
 9. Id.  
 10. Id.   
 11. Id.  
 12. Id. at 523–24, 995 A.2d at 794–95.   
 13. Id. at 524, 995 A.2d at 795.   
 14. Id.   
 15. Id.  
 16. Id.    
 17. Id. at 526–27, 995 A.2d at 796. 
 18. Id. at 526, 995 A.2d at 796.  While the Court of Special Appeals’ opinion states the 
printout identified the author as from “Fort Deposit,” Maryland, there is no Fort Deposit 
in Maryland.  The town is Port Deposit.  The Court of Appeals, in its opinion, correctly 
identified the town.  
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The profile also contained a photo of an embracing couple, which all 
parties agreed appeared to be Griffin and Barber.19
The defense counsel objected to the printout, arguing that the 
State had failed to sufficiently establish a “connection” to Barber, and 
that it had failed to question her about the profile when she was on 
the stand.
  
20  The prosecution asserted that the profile could be au-
thenticated by Sgt. John Cook, whom the defense was permitted to 
question through a voir dire exam outside the presence of the jury.21  
Sgt. Cook testified that he knew the profile page belonged to Barber 
because of the picture of her and Griffin on the page, the reference 
to their children, and the listed birth date.22  The State also called 
Barber to testify, during which time Barber said that she was dating 
Griffin, who sometimes went by the nickname “Boozy,” and that Bar-
ber and Griffin lived together with their two children.23  Barber, who 
was called to testify by only the prosecution, was not asked about the 
MySpace profile by either party.24
The trial court admitted a redacted portion of one page of the 
profile including the photo, “a description of the page creator as a 23 
year-old female from Fort Deposit, and a portion of the” statement, 
finding that the evidence was admissible for the limited purpose of 
corroborating the threat Barber allegedly made to Gibbs.
  
25  The trial 
court did not comment on the authenticity of the printout.26  Without 
waiving Griffin’s objection, defense counsel stipulated to a statement 
about the authenticity of the printout in lieu of testimony from Sgt. 
Cook.27  The court reviewed the stipulation during jury instruction, 
stating that “Sergeant Cook went online to the Web site My Space and 
downloaded an entry there, the redacted version of which is in evi-
dence, and that he would have testified that there was a photo there 
of Miss Barber.”28
The jury convicted Griffin of second degree murder, first degree 
assault, and use of a handgun in the commission of a felony or crime 
of violence in the fatal shooting of Darvell Guest on April 24, 2005.
   
29
 
 19. Id. at 526–27, 995 A.2d at 796. 
  
 20. Id. at 527, 995 A.2d at 796. 
 21. Id., 995 A.2d at 796–97.  
 22. Id., 995 A.2d at 797.  
 23. Id. at 526, 995 A.2d at 796.  
 24. Id. at 526–27, 529, 995 A.2d at 796, 798. 
 25. Id. at 527–29, 995 A.2d at 797–98.  
 26. Id.  
 27. Id. at 528, 995 A.2d at 797.  
 28. Id. at 529, 995 A.2d at 798.  
 29. Id. at 523, 995 A.2d at 794.  
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Griffin appealed to the Maryland Court of Special Appeals on the 
grounds that the trial court erred in admitting the MySpace prin-
tout.30  The Court of Special Appeals affirmed the conviction, ruling 
that the evidence was properly admitted because the prosecution, 
through the stipulated testimony provided by the police officer, had 
provided sufficient evidence to authenticate the printout.31  Griffin 
petitioned for a writ of certiorari, and the state filed a conditional 
cross appeal.32
The Court of Appeals granted certiorari to consider whether the 
trial court erred in admitting the MySpace printout and, if so, wheth-
er the error was reversible.
 
33
II.  LEGAL BACKGROUND 
  
The rapid growth and spread of new types of communication 
technology in the past twenty years—cell phones, text messaging, on-
line instant messaging programs, and social media—have prompted a 
reevaluation of an often overlooked area of evidentiary law: authenti-
cation.34  Maryland courts have had few opportunities to address the 
authentication of electronic sources of evidence and have never be-
fore addressed the issue of social media evidence in the authentica-
tion context.35
 
 30. Id.  The petitioner also argued that the trial court erred in permitting the prosecu-
tion to incorrectly describe “reasonable doubt” in his rebuttal and that the trial court 
erred in denying appellant’s request for a mistrial following an outburst by the mother of a 
witness.  Id.  These arguments were not ultimately relevant to the final disposition of the 
appeal as the court ruled against Griffin on his additional grounds for appeal.  Id. at 548, 
552, 995 A.2d at 809, 811. 
  Authentication standards, however, have not changed 
from their early common law origins—requiring only that the party 
seeking to introduce the evidence establish by a preponderance of the 
 31. Id. at 523, 543–44, 995 A.2d at 794, 806–07. 
 32. Griffin v. State, 419 Md. 343, 346–47, 19 A.3d 415, 417 (2011). 
 33. Id.  
 34. See generally Hon. Paul W. Grimm, Back to the Future: Lorraine v. Markel American 
Insurance Co. and New Findings on the Admissibility of Electronically Stored Information, 42 
AKRON L. REV.  357, 370–71 (2009) (noting that “[c]hat room and text or instant messag-
ing ‘dialogues’ . . . pose unique challenges to authentication . . . .”). 
 35. See State v. Bryant 361 Md. 420, 422, 761 A.2d 925, 926 (2000) (determining the 
authenticity of toxicology report under MD. R. 5-902); Clark v. State, 188 Md. App. 110, 
118–19, 981 A.2d 666, 670–71 (2009) (determining the authenticity of a 911 emergency 
call); Dickens v. State, 175 Md. App. 231, 237–38, 927 A.2d 32, 36 (2007) (discussing the 
authenticity of text messages sent to the victim prior to her murder).  See also Griffin, 192 
Md. App. at 538, 995 A.2d at 803 (“Despite the pervasive popularity of social networking 
sites and their potential as treasure troves of valuable evidence, Maryland appellate courts 
have not yet addressed the issue of authenticating anonymous or pseudonymous docu-
ments printed from social media Web sites.”).  
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evidence that the information is what its proponent claims it to be.36  
The same authentication standards that originated in the common 
law and were codified by the Federal Rules of Evidence and, later, by 
the Maryland Rules of Evidence have been applied to electronic 
sources of evidence without modification.37
A.  Authentication Generally 
 
The existence of specifically and individually codified authentica-
tion standards is a relatively new development in the history of Mary-
land law.38  The basic purpose of authentication, however, has not 
changed for centuries: the proponent of the evidence must, as a con-
dition precedent to the evidence’s admission, demonstrate that the 
evidence is what the proponent purports it to be.39
Prior to the adoption of the Maryland Rules of Evidence in 1993, 
the Maryland standard for authentication was based on common law, 
state statutes, and court rules,
  
40 but following a trend which began in 
the federal courts in the 1970s, the Maryland Court of Appeals opted 
for a rules-based approach modeled on the success of the Federal 
Rules of Evidence.41  The rules-based approach laid out in the Mary-
land Rules of Evidence has reduced the number of authentication 
disputes warranting a written decision in Maryland.42
 
 36. See infra Part II.A–B.  
  Indeed, since 
 37. See infra Part II.B. 
 38. See Alan D. Hornstein, The New Maryland Rules of Evidence: Survey, Analysis and Criti-
que, 54 MD. L. REV. 1032, 1032 (1995) (discussing the adoption of the Maryland Rules of 
Evidence). 
 39. Id. at 1078.  
 40. Id. at 1032. 
 41. See Adoption of New Title 5, Rules of Evidence, 333 Md. XXXV, XXXIX (1993) 
(Chasanow, J., dissenting in part) (noting that the new rules of evidence adopted by the 
court, despite changes to “over 80%” of the rules, were “patterned after the Federal Rules 
of Evidence”).  The similarity between the state and federal rules is obvious when com-
pared side-by-side.  In fact, the wording of the rules is almost identical in many places.  
Compare, e.g., FED. R. EVID. 901(a) (“To satisfy the requirement of authenticating or identi-
fying an item of evidence, the proponent must produce evidence sufficient to support a finding 
that the item is what the proponent claims it is.”) (emphasis added), with MD. R. 5-901(a) (“The 
requirement of authentication or identification as a condition precedent to admissibility is 
satisfied by evidence sufficient to support a finding that the matter in question is what its proponent 
claims.”) (emphasis added). 
 42. Only thirteen cases involving authentication have been decided by Maryland appel-
late courts since 1993. Miller v. State, 421 Md. 609, 28 A.3d 675 (2011); Washington v. 
State, 406 Md. 642, 961 A.2d 1110 (2008); State v. Bryant, 361 Md. 420, 761 A.2d 925 
(2000); Dep’t of Pub. Safety and Corr. Serv. v. Cole, 342 Md. 12, 672 A.2d 1115 (1996); 
Carpenter v. State, 196 Md. App. 212, 9 A.3d 99 (2010); Clark v. State, 188 Md. App. 110, 
981 A.2d 666 (2009); Dickens v. State, 175 Md. App. 231, 927 A.2d 32 (2007); Wagner v. 
State, 160 Md. App. 531, 864 A.2d 1037 (2005); Odum v. State, 156 Md. App. 184, 846 
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the adoption of the new rules in 1993, Maryland’s appellate decisions 
on authentication have dealt almost solely with applying the authenti-
cation rules to new types of technology, each of which applied au-
thentication standards in the Maryland Rules of Evidence without 
modification.43
1.  Development of Authentication Standards in Maryland Prior to 
the Adoption of the Federal Model 
 
Prior to the adoption of the Rules of Evidence, Maryland used 
statutory provisions, rules of practice, and common law precedent to 
determine what evidence was admissible at trial.44  Authentication 
standards were not considered a separate area of law, but rather, the 
authenticity of a piece of evidence, as well as its relevancy to the 
charges or claims in the case, was considered as part of the founda-
tion of the evidence.45
Early authentication standards were relatively lax, only requiring 
a prima facie showing that the evidence was what its proponent 
claimed it to be.
  
46  Authenticity, similar to relevance, was therefore 
treated as a threshold issue with the ultimate decision as to the belie-
vability and value of the evidence left to the jury.47
 
A.2d 445 (2004), aff’d, 412 Md. 593, 989 A.2d 232 (2010); Bradshaw v. State, 139 Md. App. 
54, 773 A.2d 1087 (2001); Gerald v. State, 137 Md. App. 295, 768 A.2d 140 (2001); State v. 
Brown, 129 Md. App. 517, 743 A.2d 262 (1999); Champion Billiards Cafe, Inc. v. Hall, 112 
Md. App. 560, 685 A.2d 901 (1996).   
  Common law me-
thods of authentication were generally divided into two groups: au-
thentication by direct proof and authentication by circumstantial 
 43. See, e.g., Dickens, 175 Md. App. 231, 238–39, 927 A.2d 32, 36–37 (analyzing authen-
ticity of several text messages and applying MD. R. 5-901).  But see Clark v. State, 188 Md. 
App. 110, 118–19 981 A.2d 666, 670 (2009) (applying MD. R. 5-901 and discussing the ad-
missibility of a 911 emergency call, which was not a new technology in 2009). 
 44. Hornstein, supra note 38, at 1032. 
 45. See e.g., Camphor v. State, 233 Md. 203, 204–05, 196 A.2d 75, 75–76 (1963) (hold-
ing that evidence was admissible at trial without separately considering its authentication, 
but discussing testimony which tended to show that the evidence was authentic).  
 46. See, e.g., Lauder v. State, 233 Md. 142, 144, 195 A.2d 610, 611 (1963) (admitting a 
store price tag as evidence of the price of the stolen object during a larceny trial after tes-
timony from the store clerk stating that the tag would have been on the stolen item and a 
finding that the tag was not inadmissible hearsay).   
 47. See Lauder, 233 Md. at 144, 195 A.2d at 611 (assuming a document to be authentic 
when applying potential hearsay exceptions as a condition precedent to admissibility).  See 
also CHARLES T. MCCORMICK, HANDBOOK ON THE LAWS OF EVIDENCE 395 (1954) (noting 
the connection between authenticity and relevance); 7 JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, EVIDENCE 
IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW §§ 2128–29 (J.H. Chadbourn ed., Little, Brown & Co. rev. ed. 
1978) (1901) [hereinafter WIGMORE, EVIDENCE]; Edmund M. Morgan, The Law of Evidence, 
1941–1945, 59 HARV. L. REV. 481, 490 (1946) (opining that disputes over authenticity 
should be submitted to the jury). 
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evidence.48  Authentication by direct proof required either (1) testi-
mony by a witness with personal knowledge of the creation of the 
document (or knowledge of the “books of concern” for custodians of 
business records) or (2) testimony by an individual familiar with the 
handwriting of the purported author to confirm that the handwriting 
on the document is the same as the handwriting of the purported au-
thor.49  In contrast, authentication by circumstantial evidence could 
be proven by a showing that (1) “a generation had passed since a 
document was written” and the document is “unsuspicious in appear-
ance;”50 (2) the document was obtained from the custody of a public 
official who would have such documents in the course of his regular 
duties;51 (3) the document in question was obtained from the custody 
of a private person who is purported to be the author, if the court de-
termined this was appropriate;52 or (4) the letter or telephone mes-
sage was a reply to an earlier conversation.53
Maryland courts have generally addressed authentication issues 
indirectly, treating the issue of authentication as a part of the broader 
question of admissibility.  For example, in Lauder v. State
 
54 the Court 
of Appeals held that the price tag on a stolen tape recorder was ad-
missible as evidence showing the recorder’s value because the tag was 
identified by a witness and was a business record rather than hear-
say.55  In some instances, the “trustworthiness”—a term used inter-
changeably with authentication—of a document was considered along 
with possible hearsay exceptions as part of the same question of ad-
missibility.56
 
 48. MCCORMICK, supra note 
  The development of authentication law in this manner 
left no clear standards for courts to determine whether a piece of evi-
47, at 398–406. 
 49. Id. at 398–401. 
 50. Id. at 401. 
 51. Id. at 403. 
 52. Propst v. State, 5 Md. App. 36, 43, 245 A.2d 88, 92 (1968) (“We hold, however, that 
the evidence was admissible as to Ruth Virginia May under the principle that writings tak-
en from an accused pursuant to a lawful search are admissible without further proof of the 
genuineness.”). 
 53. McCormick, supra note 47, at 404–05. 
 54. 233 Md. 142, 195 A.2d 610 (1963).  
 55. Id. at 144, 195 A.2d at 611. 
 56. See, e.g., Morrow v. State, 190 Md. 559, 562–63, 59 A.2d 325, 326 (1948) (holding a 
receipt admissible where there was a statutory hearsay exception and it “would seem to 
meet the tests of ‘necessity and circumstantial guaranty of trustworthiness’”(quoting Back-
un v. United States, 112 F.2d 635, 639 (4th Cir. 1940)).  See also Jennifer L. Mnookin, The 
Image of Truth: Photographic Evidence and the Power of Analogy, 10 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 1, 52 
n.187 (1998) (noting that over time, in the context of photographic evidence, judges subs-
tituted tests looking to the trustworthiness of sources for strict authentication require-
ments). 
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dence was “trustworthy” or “authentic,” leading to relatively lax stan-
dards for authentication.57  Such lax standards were demonstrated in 
Morrow v. State,58 in which the Court of Appeals ruled that a receipt 
was sufficiently trustworthy to be admitted into trial where it was gen-
erated in the normal course of business and there was no evidence 
that the receipt was not “trustworthy.”59  These lax standards of au-
thentication remain evident in the modern application of authentica-
tion rules.60
2.  The Process of Authentication at Trial 
  
As a condition precedent to admissibility, the party seeking to 
admit a document or other information into evidence must show, by a 
preponderance of the evidence, that the document or information is 
authentic, and that information “is what its proponent claims.”61 
Some sources of evidence—such as government publications or 
newspapers—are considered to be inherently trustworthy and there-
fore are self-authenticating.62   These self-authenticating sources do 
not need additional evidence to be admitted, provided they are rele-
vant.63
 
 57. Cf. Propst v. State, 5 Md. App. 36, 43, 245 A.2d 88, 92 (1968) (holding that a doc-
ument was properly authenticated because the writings were taken from an accused pur-
suant to a lawful search, and stating that such a finding “seems inherent in the holding of 
the Court of Appeals of Maryland in Lauder v. State, 233 Md. 142, 195 A.2d 610 [(1963)], 
and more particularly in Camphor v. State, 233 Md. 203, 196 A.2d 75 [(1963)]”).  This 
statement reveals a lack of clear standards regarding authentication of evidence.  The logic 
of the holding indicates exactly how lax the standards were because the Propst court held 
that simply because a piece of paper was taken from the defendant, he was assumed to 
have written it.  Id. 
  All evidence that does not fall into one of the eleven excep-
tions of self-authenticating sources described in Md. Rule 5-902(a) 
requires that the party introducing the evidence make a prima facie 
 58. 190 Md. 559, 59 A.2d 325 (1948). 
 59. Id. at 562–63, 59 A.2d 326. 
 60. See MD. R. 5-901, which only requires that a party show that the evidence is “suffi-
cient to support a finding that the matter in question is what its proponent claims” and 
provides a non-exhaustive list of illustrations demonstrating authenticity. 
 61. MD. R. 5-901.  Additionally, the process of authentication in Maryland courts is 
identical in almost all respects to the federal method—the only exception being the 
“comparison with authenticated specimens” method of authentication.  In federal courts, 
both the jury and the judge (if it is a bench trial) can compare the specimens.  See FED. R. 
EVID. 901(b)(3) (allowing “[a] comparison with an authenticated specimen by an expert 
witness or the trier of fact) (emphasis added).  In Maryland, however, only an expert witness 
or the judge in a bench trial may compare an authenticated specimen with an unauthenti-
cated one to determine if they are the same.  MD. R. 5-901(b)(3). 
 62. MD. R. 5-902(a)(1)–(6). 
 63. MD. R. 5-902(a).  
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showing that the evidence is authentic.64  This showing can be made 
in one of nine suggested ways: testimony of a witness with knowledge; 
non-expert opinion on handwriting; comparison with an authenti-
cated specimen by the court or an expert; circumstantial evidence; 
voice identification; a telephone conversation where the circums-
tances show that the call was authentic; public records; evidence that 
the document is more than twenty years old and not suspicious; or a 
showing that the document is the result of a process or system that 
produces accurate results,65 such as a breathalyzer test.  If the court 
determines that the party seeking to introduce the evidence meets its 
burden of proving authenticity, then the document is admitted into 
evidence.66  In some cases, however, authenticity can be demonstrated 
only if a condition of fact were found to be true; in these cases the 
court must “admit [the evidence] upon, or subject to, the introduc-
tion of evidence sufficient to support a finding by the trier of fact that 
the condition has been fulfilled.”67
3.  Authentication in the Maryland Rules of Evidence 
  
The Maryland Rules of Evidence require “authentication or iden-
tification as a condition precedent to admissibility” which “is satisfied 
by evidence sufficient to support a finding that the matter in question 
is what its proponent claims.”68  The Maryland Rules were adopted on 
December 15, 1993, by the Maryland Court of Appeals and made ef-
fective on July 1, 1994.69  The rules were derived from the Federal 
Rules of Evidence, which were adopted on January 2, 1975, as an at-
tempt to organize and update the common law rules of evidence.70  
Despite a change in the language of the Federal Rules of Evidence 
with the adoption of the Maryland Rules of Evidence, the methods 
and standards of authentication have remained consistent with com-
mon law principles.71
 
 64. Gerald v. State, 137 Md. App. 295, 304–05, 768 A.2d 140, 145 (2001). 
  
 65. MD. R. 5-901(b). 
 66. MD. R. 5-901; MD. R. 5-104(a). 
 67. MD. R. 5-104(b). 
 68. MD. R. 5-901(a). 
 69. Adoption of Maryland Rules of Evidence, 333 Md. XXXV, XXXV (1993).  
 70. Pub L. No. 93-595, § 1, 88 Stat. 1943 (1975); see Adoption of Maryland Rules of 
Evidence, 333 Md. XXXV, XXXVI (1993) (Eldridge, J., dissenting) (“There has long been 
a movement in this country towards codifying all areas of the law and away from the com-
mon law approach.”). 
 71. Compare MD. R. 5-901(a) (requiring evidence sufficient to support a finding of au-
thenticity as a “condition precedent” to admissibility), with WIGMORE, EVIDENCE, supra 
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Maryland courts generally have applied two principles in inter-
preting the authentication rules since their adoption: first, the inter-
pretation of the Federal Rules of Evidence is instructive in the appli-
cation of the Maryland rules; and second, the burden of proof for au-
authentication is “slight,” requiring only “sufficient evidence that the 
jury ultimately might [find that the evidence is what its proponent 
claimed].”72  Indeed, several authentication cases decided in Mary-
land since the adoption of the rules initially address the question of 
authentication by considering the application of Federal Rule of Evi-
dence 901,73 which Maryland Rule of Evidence 5-901 greatly resem-
bles.74  Each of these cases also sets low authentication standards and 
places a high level of trust in the jury’s ability to judge the trustwor-
thiness of evidence presented.75  The broad scope of possible authen-
tication methods is emphasized in the rules themselves, which in ad-
dition to providing eleven possible types of self-authenticating sources 
of evidence,76 also explicitly state that the ten authentication methods 
outlined in Maryland Rule 5-901 are included “[b]y way of illustration 
only, and not by way of limitation.”77
Maryland courts have broadly construed specific rules to apply 
across a number of diverse factual situations.
 
78
 
note 
  For example, in Clark 
47, at 694 (noting that authentication rules ensure that evidence is “sufficient to go to 
the jury”). 
 72. Dickens v. State, 175 Md. App. 231, 239, 927 A.2d 32, 37 (2007).  
 73. See, e.g., Miller v. State, 421 Md. 609, 620–21, 28 A.3d 675, 681–82 (2011) (discuss-
ing the application of MD. R. 5-901(b)(3) and authentication by comparison with authen-
ticated specimens in light of FED. R. EVID. 901(b)(3)); Dickens, 175 Md. App. at 239, 927 
A.2d at 37 (“Under Federal Rule 901, from which Maryland Rule 5-901 is derived, the bur-
den of proof for authentication is slight, and the court ‘need not find that the evidence is 
necessarily what the proponent claims, but only that there is sufficient evidence that the 
jury ultimately might do so.’” (quoting United States v. Safavian, 435 F. Supp. 2d 36, 38 
(D.D.C. 2006))). 
 74. Compare MD. R. 5-901 with FED. R. EVID. 901. 
 75. Miller, 421 Md. at 621, 28 A.3d at 682; Dickens, 175 Md. App. at 239, 927 A.2d at 37 
(quoting Safavian, 435 F. Supp. 2d at 38).  
 76. MD. R. 5-902(a). 
 77. MD. R. 5-901(b). 
 78. See, e.g., Bradshaw v. State, 139 Md. App. 54, 65–66, 773 A.2d 1087, 1094 (2001) 
(authenticating a violent “written poem or rap song” allegedly written by the defendant 
near the time of the murder after considering circumstantial evidence); Gerald v. State, 
137 Md. App. 295, 304–05, 768 A.2d 140, 145–46 (2001) (holding that a letter was properly 
authenticated using circumstantial evidence under Md. R. 5-901(b)(4)).  In both of these 
cases the court applied a single method of authentication, circumstantial evidence under 
Md. R. 5-901(b)(4), to evaluate the evidence presented to the court, despite differing con-
texts, sources of circumstantial evidence, and possible other methods of authentication. 
Bradshaw, 139 Md. App. at 65–66, 773 A.2d at 1094; Gerald, 137 Md. App. at 304–05, 768 
A.2d at 145–46. 
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v. State,79 the Maryland Court of Special Appeals broadly applied au-
thentication rules in a 2007 domestic battery case involving the au-
thentication of 911 recordings from the victim that described the as-
sailant and the nature of the assault.80  The 911 call was authenticated 
under Rule 5-901(b)(4), which permits “appearance, contents, sub-
stance, internal patterns, location, or other distinctive characteristics” 
to substitute for direct testimony or evidence as to the authentica-
tion.81  The woman on the 911 call identified herself as “Marsha 
Thomas,” stated that her assailant had abused her and told the opera-
tor that she would be waiting for the police near the front desk of the 
hotel in which she was staying.82  Additionally, when police officers ar-
rived at the hotel, they found a woman suffering from multiple inju-
ries who had a driver’s license with the name “Marsha Thomas.”83  
The court found that this information provided sufficient “distinctive 
characteristics” under 5-901(b)(4).84
Even though Maryland has adopted formal rules of evidence, 
many of the cases that consider authentication issues look to cases 
handed down before the passage of the rules of evidence to deter-
mine whether or not the evidence presented is what its proponent 
purports it to be.
  
85  While the courts have not looked to the common 
law in every circumstance,86
 
 79. 188 Md. App. 110, 981 A.2d 666 (2009). 
 the influence of the early common law 
 80. Id. at 118–19, 981 A.2d at 670–71.  
 81. MD. R. 5-904(b); Clark, 188 Md. App. at 118–19, 981 A.2d at 670–71.  
 82. Id. at 119, 981 A.2d at 671. 
 83. Id. 
 84. Id.; MD. R. 5-901(b)(4).  This rule is the descendent of the common law rule that 
“sundry circumstances (including other admissions and the like) may suffice” to authenti-
cate evidence where no direct testimony is possible.  See also Knoedler v. State, 69 Md. App. 
764, 772–74, 519 A.2d 811, 815 (1987) (holding that circumstantial evidence was sufficient 
to authenticate phone calls and records, and mitigate the possibility of fraud or imposi-
tion).  The implication of this holding is that sufficient circumstantial evidence is enough 
to overcome the minimal threshold for authentication and protect against the fear of 
fraud or imposition, while still allowing the jury to determine the proper weight for the 
evidence presented to it in the case.   
 85. See Clark, 188 Md. App. at 118–19, 981 A.2d at 671 (citing and quoting Knoedler, 69 
Md. App. at 772–74, 519 A.2d at 815); Bradshaw v. State, 139 Md. App. 54, 66, 773 A.2d 
1087, 1094 (2001) (citing Gray v. State, 53 Md. App. 699, 456 A.2d 1290 (1983)).  See also 
Gerald v. State, 137 Md. App. 295, 305, 768 A.2d 140, 145–46 (2001) (suggesting a “totality 
of the circumstances” method of authentication not explicitly listed in the rules of evi-
dence).  
 86. See, e.g., Carpenter v. State, 196 Md. App. 212, 225–28, 9 A.3d 99, 106–08 (2010) 
(discussing the authentication of text messages without referencing the common law rules 
for the authentication of evidence in Maryland). 
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standards has played a significant role in how the Maryland courts 
have interpreted authentication standards in the rules of evidence.87
B.  Authentication of Electronic Evidence 
 
While the Maryland Court of Appeals has not adopted a formal 
standard for authenticating electronic evidence, the Court of Special 
Appeals has evaluated electronic evidence authentication issues in 
much the same way it has considered non-electronic evidence cases.88  
The federal courts and other jurisdictions that have adopted similar 
rules of evidence have considered electronic evidence in the authen-
tication context and have established a relatively clear baseline for the 
analysis of similar types of evidence under the existing rules of evi-
dence.89  Some courts in other states have explicitly stated that the 
rules of evidence do not need to be supplemented to handle authen-
tication of text messages, emails, social media, and the like.90
1.  Application of Authentication Standards to Electronic Evidence in 
Maryland 
 
The Court of Appeals has never addressed the authentication of 
electronic evidence and the lower Maryland courts have had only li-
mited opportunities to consider how evidence from text messages, re-
covered cell phones, computers, websites, and other electronic 
sources can be authenticated.91  In 2007, in Dickens v. State,92 the 
Court of Special Appeals addressed the admissibility of a text message 
that a defendant purportedly sent to the victim in a domestic murder 
case.93
 
 87. For example, in Bradshaw, 139 Md. App. at 65–66, 773 A.2d, 1094, the Maryland 
Court of Special Appeals cited the common law precedent of Gray, 53 Md. App. 699, 426 
A.2d. 1290, to analyze an authentication issue under the Maryland Rules.  
  The court found the text message was properly admitted be-
cause the defendant possessed the cell phone connected to the text 
message at the time of his arrest, and the defendant had made verbal 
 88. See infra Part II.B.1. 
 89. See infra Part II.B.2. 
 90. See infra Part II.B.3. 
 91. Other than Griffin v. State, there have only been three published Maryland cases 
dealing with authentication of “electronic communications,” none of which  have dealt 
with social media.  Carpenter, 196 Md. App. at 225, 9 A.3d at 106 (addressing the authenti-
cation of information taken from a recovered cellular telephone); Dickens v. State, 175 
Md. App. 231, 239, 927 A.2d 32, 37 (2007) (considering the authentication of text messag-
es); Chaney v. Family Dollar Store of Md., No. 24-C-06-11462, 2007 WL 5997994, at *2 (Md. 
Cir. Ct. Dec. 26, 2007) (dealing with the authentication of a printout from a website).    
 92. 175 Md. App. 231, 927 A.2d 32 (2007).  
 93. Id. at 239, 927 A.2d at 37. 
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statements contemporaneous with and similar to the text message in 
question.94  The court held that the evidence presented was sufficient 
to meet the “slight” burden on the proponent of the evidence.95
In Carpenter v. State,
  
96 the Court of Special Appeals found that 
caller ID information, including the name of the caller and the time 
of the phone call, recovered from a cell phone was properly authenti-
cated where, along with additional circumstantial evidence, it was 
proven that “when [the victim], after answering a call to the cell 
phone, agreed to meet the caller at a gas station, the person who met 
[the victim] at the gas station was [the defendant].”97  In Carpenter, 
the court adopted the Dickens standard for the authentication of evi-
dence at trial, stating that because “the jury ‘could infer, legitimately,’ 
that [the defendant] made the calls missed and received by the cell 
phone” the information was properly authenticated by the party seek-
ing its introduction.98
In Chaney v. Family Dollar Store of Maryland,
  
99 Circuit Court Judge 
W. Michel Pierson refused to admit a printout from the website 
“wunderground.com” in the absence of additional authenticating in-
formation.100  The website printout contained weather reports stating 
that there was no precipitation in the location of the defendant’s 
parking lots on the date of the plaintiff’s slip and fall.101  The court re-
jected the website’s admission because the printout was unaccompa-
nied by any other identifying evidence and lacked further informa-
tion about the source.102
2.  Federal Case Law on the Authentication of Electronic Evidence 
 
Federal courts have had numerous opportunities to address the 
authentication of electronic evidence in recent years and have opted 
to apply existing evidentiary standards in these cases.103
 
 94. Id. at 239–40, 927 A.2d at 37. 
  The devel-
 95. Id. at 239, 927 A.2d at 37 (discussing FED. R. EVID. 901) (quoting United States v. 
Safavian, 435 F. Supp. 2d. 36, 38 (D.D.C. 2006)). 
 96. 196 Md. App. 212, 9 A.3d 99 (2010). 
 97. Id. at 219–20, 228, 9 A.3d at 103, 108.  
 98. Id. at 228, 9 A.3d at 108 (quoting Dickens, 175 Md. App. at 239, 927 A.2d at 37).  
 99. No. 24-C-06-11462, 2007 WL 5997994 (Md. Cir. Ct. Dec. 26, 2007). 
 100. Id. at *1. 
 101. Id. 
 102. Id.  
 103. See, e.g., Lorraine v. Markel Am. Ins. Co., 241 F.R.D. 534, 543 (D. Md. 2007) (not-
ing that federal courts have been “quick to reject calls to abandon the existing rules of evi-
dence” for electronic information, but stating that “courts increasingly are demanding that 
proponents of evidence obtained from electronically stored information pay more atten-
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opment of electronic authentication standards in the federal system 
tracks closely to the historical origins of authentication standards with 
an emphasis on a prima facie showing of authenticity and a focus on 
the role of the jury in determining the relative weight to apply to evi-
dence introduced by the parties and admitted by the court.104  The 
consideration of electronic evidence has generally followed the same 
standards of authentication used for traditional forms of evidence.105  
In Lorraine v. Markel American Insurance Co.,106 Chief Magistrate Judge 
Paul W. Grimm described the authentication of electronic evidence as 
“not a particularly high barrier to overcome” and noted that where 
electronic evidence is not admitted, the “failure to authenticate . . . 
almost always is a self-inflicted injury which can be avoided by though-
tful advance preparation.”107  The party seeking to introduce the ex-
hibit must make a prima facie showing that the evidence is what he 
says it is.108   The court does not need to find that the evidence is what 
its proponent claims it is, only that a reasonable jury might ultimately 
do so.109
Despite the similarities with the general approach to authentica-
tion of evidence, federal courts have noted that there is a duty to 
properly scrutinize electronic evidence and that such evidence may 
require higher levels of examination than traditional forms of evi-
 
 
tion to the foundational requirements than has been customary for introducing evidence 
not produced from electronic sources”).  In some ways, the consideration of “electronic 
evidence” predates the modern concept of electronic communication, see, for example, 
United States v. Reilly, 33 F.3d 1396, 1404 (3d Cir. 1994), discussing the admissibility of ra-
dio telegrams.   
 104. See Lorraine, 241 F.R.D. at 541–42 (discussing the prima facie threshold for authen-
tication of evidence regardless of the origin or type of evidence).  See also United States v. 
Safavian, 435 F. Supp. 2d 36, 38 (D.D.C. 2006) (stating that the burden for authentication 
is met by a prima facie showing that the evidence is what its proponent claims it to be).  
 105. Compare Lorraine, 241 F.R.D. at 542 (stating that electronic evidence only requires a 
prima facie showing of authenticity to be admitted), with First State Bank of Denton v. Md. 
Cas. Co., 918 F.2d 38, 41 (5th Cir. 1990) (holding that to authenticate a phone call for 
evidentiary purposes, the proponent need only “offer ‘sufficient authentication to make a  
prima facie case that would allow the issue of identity to be decided by the jury” (quoting 
United States v. Register, 496 F.2d 1072, 1077 (5th Cir. 1974))). 
 106. 241 F.R.D. 534 (2007). In Lorraine, the Court dismissed the parties’ cross-claims for 
summary judgment in a civil action to enforce an arbitration award because neither party 
supported its affidavit with admissible relevant evidence. Id. at 534–35, 585.  In writing the 
Lorraine opinion, Judge Grimm provided a comprehensive overview of the process re-
quired to thoroughly vet electronic evidence prior to admitting it in a court proceeding.  
Id. at 537–85. 
 107. Id. at 542. 
 108. Id.  
 109. See United States v. Safavian, 435 F. Supp. 2d. 36, 38 (2006) (explaining that au-
thentication requires only “that there is sufficient evidence that the jury might find that 
the evidence is what it purports to be”). 
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dence in some cases.110  The analysis used by the courts, however, fits 
within the existing rules of evidence, rather than limiting the consid-
eration to certain types of methods to show authentication.111
While a large number of cases in the federal system deal with 
electronic evidence,
  
112 there are no federal cases that have addressed 
the admissibility of evidence in the social media context.113  The fed-
eral courts have, however, had the opportunity to consider social me-
dia in other contexts and have generally treated social media com-
munication no differently than other forms of electronic evidence 
when considering such evidence in a non-authentication context.114    
Courts have had the opportunity to consider several types of similar 
factual circumstances: authentication of chat logs,115 authentication of 
postings to a public Internet forum,116
 
 110. In re Vee Vinhee, 336 B.R. 437, 444–45 (9th Cir. B.A.P. 2005) (recognizing that 
while the only difference between electronic and paper records is the format, the unique 
nature of the electronic format “presents more complicated variations on the authentica-
tion problem than for paper records”).   
 and authentication of informa-
 111. For examples of federal courts applying traditional authentication methods while 
considering whether a proper foundation had been laid for the admission of electronic 
evidence, see United States v. Tank, 200 F.3d 627, 630–31 (9th Cir. 2000) (analyzing ad-
missibility of exhibits reflecting chat room conversations); United States v. Simpson, 152 
F.3d 1241, 1249–50 (10th Cir. 1998) (analyzing authentication of chat room printouts in a 
child pornography case); Telewizja Polska USA, Inc. v. Echostar Satellite Corp., No. 02 C 
3293, 2004 WL 2367740, at *6 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 15, 2004) (analyzing admissibility of the con-
tent of a website). 
 112.  See supra note 111 for a list of several cases discussing electronic evidence in a non-
social media context. See also Lorraine, 241 F.R.D. 534 (discussing the applications of the 
Federal Rules of Evidence to electronic evidence in general). 
 113. There are many cases where social media is considered in other contexts, most of-
ten commercial law, civil procedure, or free speech contexts.  The facts of those cases, 
however, very rarely turn on whether or not a specific piece of social media evidence is au-
thentic and the issue of authenticity is rarely, if ever, addressed in those contexts.  See, e.g., 
Crispin v. Christian Audigier, Inc., 717 F. Supp. 2d 965, 969 (C.D. Cal. 2010) (discussing 
the effect of the Stored Communications Act on subpoenas duces tecum served on Face-
book, MySpace, and other social networking sites); Indep. Newspapers, Inc. v. Brodie, 407 
Md. 415, 419, 966 A.2d 432, 435 (2009) (finding that a circuit court judge abused his dis-
cretion when ordering that five anonymous Internet forum posters’ identities be revealed 
in a defamation case, without discussing the authentication of electronic evidence).  
 114. See, e.g., United States v. Ragland, 434 F. App’x 863, 871 (11th Cir. 2011) (analyzing 
under Fed. R. Evid. 403 and 400, and admitting into evidence the partial music video tak-
en from the defendant’s MySpace page in a Hobbs Act case with ten armed convenience 
store robberies).  
 115. Tank, 200 F.3d at 630–31 (applying traditional rules of evidence and finding that 
chat records were admissible in a child molestation case). 
 116. Univ. of Kansas v. Sinks, 565 F. Supp. 2d 1216, 1231 (D. Kan. 2008) (holding that 
postings to a message board at the website KUsports.com were admissible only to show the 
declarants’ mental state but not for the truth of the matter asserted).  
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tion posted directly to a website.117  Despite these opportunities, 
courts have not found it necessary to augment or change the existing 
rules of evidence to deal with those very similar circumstances.118
3.  Authentication of Electronic Evidence in Other States 
 
While Maryland and federal courts have not had the opportunity 
to consider the authentication of evidence from a social media web-
site, courts in several other jurisdictions have done so.  A New York 
court held, in People v. Clevenstine,119 that chat logs from MySpace were 
properly authenticated in a child molestation case where there was 
testimony from both victims stating that they had spoken to the de-
fendant online, the defendant’s wife testified that she had seen sex-
ually explicit conversations on her husband’s MySpace account, the 
messages were recovered from the victims’ computer, and a MySpace 
employee testified that the message logs were created by a MySpace 
chat.120  The defendant’s claim that his account had been hacked was 
found to present a factual issue for the jury and was not proper 
grounds for appeal because it had not been asserted at trial.121
In State v. Eleck,
  
122 the Connecticut Appellate Court held that the 
defendant, who was convicted of assault, had failed to authenticate 
the authorship of messages sent via Facebook that were introduced at 
trial to impeach the victim witness for the State, who claimed she had 
not spoken to the defendant.123  The only authentication of the mes-
sage printouts was the testimony of the defendant, who stated that he 
had printed the messages from his computer and knew that the ac-
count which had sent the messages to him belonged to the victim.124
 
 117. Williams v. Long, 585 F. Supp. 2d 679, 689 (D. Md. 2008) (finding that a printed 
webpage from the Maryland Judiciary Case Search website is self-authenticating under 
Rule 902(5)). 
  
Additionally, the victim denied sending the messages, claiming that 
 118. Lorraine v. Markel Am. Ins. Co., 241 F.R.D. 534, 543 (D. Md. 2007) (noting that 
courts have been “quick to reject calls to abandon the existing rules of evidence” when 
dealing with electronic information); See also In re F.P., 878 A.2d 91, 95 (Pa. Super. Ct. 
2005) (applying existing authentication standards to Internet chat records and explicitly 
declining to change the authentication rules for electronic evidence). 
 119. 891 N.Y.S.2d. 511, 511 (N.Y. App. Div. 2009). 
 120. Id. at 514. 
 121. Id.  
 122. It is important to note that this case was decided after Griffin v. State and cites to 
the Court of Appeals decision as persuasive authority.  Id. at 823–24 (citing Griffin v. State, 
419 Md. 343, 363–64, 19 A.3d 415 (2011)).  
 123. Id. at 819–20, 824. 
 124. Id. at 821. 
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her account had been hacked.125  The court, citing the Connecticut 
Code of Evidence,126 found that the information provided by the de-
fendant was insufficient to authenticate the messages as having been 
authored by the victim, especially in light of the fact that the victim 
claimed her account had been “hacked.”127
Similarly, the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, in Com-
monwealth v. Williams,
   
128 held that chat records from MySpace were 
not properly authenticated in a murder trial where the only evidence 
of authenticity was the testimony of a single witness who claimed to 
have received the messages from the defendant’s brother’s account.129  
Unlike in Eleck, however, there was no testimony that the account was 
hacked, rather the court found that because there was “no testimo-
ny . . . regarding how secure such a Web page is, who can access a 
MySpace Web page, [or] whether codes are needed for access” the 
messages were not properly authenticated.130
III.  THE COURT’S REASONING  
 
In Griffin v. State, the Maryland Court of Appeals held that the 
pages allegedly printed from Barber’s MySpace profile were not 
properly authenticated as per the Maryland Rules of Evidence, revers-
ing the judgment of the Court of Special Appeals.131  Judge Battaglia, 
writing for the majority, reasoned that “[t]he potential for abuse and 
manipulation of a social networking site by someone other than its 
purported creator and/or user” required a higher level of authentica-
tion than the prosecution had provided.132  The court held that the 
information on the MySpace printout—a picture of Barber, along 
with her birth date and location—“were not sufficient ‘distinctive cha-
racteristics’ to authenticate” the redacted printout.133
 
 125. Id. at 824.  
  The court fur-
 126. CONN. CODE OF EVID. § 9-1(a) (which states, in relevant part, “the requirement of 
authentication as a condition precedent to admissibility is satisfied by evidence sufficient 
to support a finding that the offered evidence is what its proponent claims it to be”).  
 127. Eleck, 23 A.3d at 824.  It is interesting to note that the court did not address this 
issue as a matter of conditional relevance.  There is conflicting evidence that the messages 
were authentic—the court accepts that the messages came from the victim’s account, but 
the consideration as to whether or not the account had, in fact, been “hacked” would seem 
to be a matter for the jury to consider, and therefore, the messages should have been con-
ditionally admitted under Conn. Code Evid. § 1-3(b).  
 128. 926 N.E.2d 1162 (Mass. 2010). 
 129. Id. at 1172. 
 130. Id.  
 131. 419 Md. 343, 347–48, 19 A.3d 415, 418 (2011).  
 132. Id. at 357–58, 19 A.3d at 424.  
 133. Id. at 357, 19 A.3d at 424.  
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ther suggested three means by which social media evidence could be 
authenticated, all of which impose a higher standard on social media 
evidence than other types of evidence.134
The court began its examination by restating a definition of so-
cial networking websites from an earlier case, in which such sites were 
defined as “‘sophisticated tools of communication where the user vo-
luntarily provides information that the user wants to share with oth-
ers.’”
 
135  The primary focus of the court’s analysis was the ease with 
which an individual could establish a social network account under a 
fictitious name or even assume the identity of another person by 
fraudulently creating an account in another person’s name.136  The 
court reasoned that the “potential for fabricating or tampering with 
electronically stored information on a social networking site . . . poses 
significant challenges from the standpoint of authentication of prin-
touts of the site.”137
The court then discussed the Maryland rules governing authenti-
cation of evidence, noting that two possible rules could apply: Md. 
Rule 5-901(b)(1), testimony of a witness with knowledge, and Md. 
Rule 5-901(b)(4), circumstantial evidence.
 
138  The court noted that 
this issue had not been considered previously in Maryland courts.139
The court continued its analysis of related opinions from other 
jurisdictions by noting that several courts have “suggested greater 
scrutiny” for authentication of electronic evidence due to “the heigh-
tened possibility for manipulation by other than the true user or post-
   
 
 134. Id. at 363–65, 19 A.3d at 427–28.  The three suggested means of authentication are: 
(1) asking the purported creator if he created the posting in question; (2) using computer 
forensics to examine a computer’s Internet history and hard drive to determine whether a 
specific computer created the content in question; and (3) obtaining information directly 
from the social networking site in question.  Id.  These suggestions impose a higher stan-
dard than is articulated in the Maryland Rules of Evidence, which allow authentication of 
all types of evidence by circumstantial evidence alone, or by testimony of any witness with 
knowledge.  MD. R. 5-901(b)(1), (4). 
 135. Id. at 351, 19 A.3d at 420 (quoting Indep. Newspapers, Inc. v. Brodie, 407 Md. 415, 
424 n.3, 966 A.2d 432, 438 n.3 (2009)).  The court also noted that MySpace, like other so-
cial networking sites, allows members to share photos, videos, and other information on 
personal web pages.  Id. (quoting Doe v. MySpace, Inc., 474 F. Supp.2d 843, 845 (W.D. 
Tex. 2007), aff’d, 528 F.3d 413 (5th Cir. 2008)).  
 136. Griffin, 419 Md. at 352, 19 A.3d at 421.  The court noted that one Boston-based In-
ternet company had succeeded in obtaining nearly 200 Facebook “friends” for an account 
created in the name of a toy frog called “Freddi Staur.”  Id. at 353–54, 19 A.3d at 421 (cit-
ing Samantha L. Miller, Note, The Facebook Frontier: Responding to the Changing Face of Privacy 
on the Internet, 97 KY. L.J. 541, 542 (2009)).   
 137. Griffin, 419 Md. at 354, 19 A.3d at 422.   
 138. Id. at 354–55, 19 A.3d at 422.   
 139. Id. at 355, 19 A.3d at 422. 
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er.”140  The court, however, did draw a distinction between emails, in-
stant messages, and text messages, on the one hand, and information 
posted on social networking or other websites, on the other, noting 
that the dangers of emails and similar communications are markedly 
reduced because they are intended for a limited number of recipients 
rather than the public at large.141  In the end, the court suggested 
three possible ways to authenticate printouts from social networking 
sites.142
After reciting the facts of the case, the court determined that, be-
cause the prosecution had only offered limited evidence pertaining to 
the origin of the profile (the photo on the profile page of Barber and 
the purported location and birth date of the owner of the page), the 
prosecution failed to provide sufficient “distinctive characteristics” to 
properly authenticate the MySpace printouts.
 
143
The court explicitly stated that, despite the  prosecution’s failure 
to authenticate the posting in this case, printouts from social media 
sites were not de facto inadmissible.
  
144  Rather, the court suggested a 
non-exhaustive list of three potential methods for authenticating so-
cial networking printouts: (1) testimony from the purported creator 
affirming that he had created the content; (2) forensic evidence from 
the computer of the purported creator; and (3) information about 
the creation of the content from the social networking site itself.145  
None of these methods were used to authenticate the MySpace prin-
tout in this case.146
The court found that, because the prosecution had described 
Gibbs as its “most important witness” and highlighted the importance 
of the “snitches get stitches” posting in its closing argument, the trial 
 
 
 140. Id. at 358–61, 19 A.3d at 424–26.  Specifically, the court discussed the decisions of 
Commonwealth v. Williams, 926 N.E.2d 1162 (Mass. 2010), People v. Lenihan, 911 N.Y.S.2d. 
588 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2010), and United States v. Jackson, 208 F.3d 633 (7th Cir. 2000), in not-
ing the higher level of scrutiny that other courts had placed on electronic evidence from 
social networking sites.  In all those cases, the courts found that the electronic evidence 
that was presented for admission was not properly authenticated due to a fear of fabrica-
tion or falsification.  The court distinguished In Re F.P., 878 A.2d 91 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2005), 
a case involving authentication of instant message chat, on the grounds that it was “unper-
suasive in the context of a social networking site, because the . . . recipient [identified] his 
own distinctive characteristics,” which was not the case in Griffin.  Griffin, 419 Md. at 361, 
19 A.3d at 426. 
 141. Griffin, 419 Md. at 361 n.13, 19 A.3d at 426 n.13. 
 142. Id. at 363–65, 19 A.3d at 427–28. 
 143. Id. at 357–58, 19 A.3d at 423–24. 
 144. Id. at 363, 19 A.3d at 427.   
 145. Id. at 363–64, 19 A.3d at 427–28.  
 146. See id. at 348–50, 19 A.3d at 418–19. 
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court’s admission into evidence of the improperly authenticated 
MySpace printouts was reversible error.147
Judge Harrell, joined by Judge Murphy, dissented, arguing that 
the information presented by the prosecution—the photo of Ms. Bar-
ber and the defendant, Ms. Barber’s birth date on the printout, a de-
scription of the purported creator of the website as a 23-year-old 
woman from Port Deposit, and references to freeing “Boozy”—were 
sufficient to authenticate the printout.
   
148  The dissent further argued 
that the Court of Appeals should have adopted the “reasonable juror” 
standard articulated by the Maryland Court of Special Appeals in Dick-
ens v. State,149 which states evidence should be admitted where there is 
enough information such that a reasonable juror could find the evi-
dence presented to be authentic.150  Judge Harrell argued that the 
“technological heebie jeebies” discussed in the majority opinion—the 
possibility of manipulation or abuse—should go to the weight of the 
evidence rather than its admissibility.151
IV.  ANALYSIS 
 
In Griffin v. State, the Court of Appeals attempted to reconcile the 
existing rules of evidence—authentication, specifically—with the rap-
id development of electronic communication, suggesting that sepa-
rate rules of authentication should be applied to social media evi-
dence used at trial.152  The court’s suggestion that social media 
evidence should be subject to a separate, higher level of authentica-
tion does not comport with the existing rules of evidence or the 
common-law origins of authentication standards.153  Furthermore, 
under the existing rules of authentication, the prosecution provided 
sufficient circumstantial evidence for the trial court to admit the 
MySpace printout.154
 
 147. Id. at 362–63, 19 A.3d at 427. 
  
 148. Griffin, 419 Md. at 365, 367, 19 A.3d at 428–29 (Harrell, J., dissenting). 
 149. 175 Md. App. 231, 239, 927 A.2d 32, 37 (2007) (quoting United States v. Safavian, 
435 F. Supp. 2d 36, 38 (D.D.C. 2006)) (stating that “the burden of proof for authentica-
tion is slight”). 
 150. Griffin, 419 Md. at 366–67, 19 A.3d at 429 (Harrell, J., dissenting) (citing Dickens, 
175 Md. App. at 239, 927 A,2d at 37). 
 151. Id. at 367, 927 A.2d at 430.  
 152. See supra Part III. 
 153. See infra Part IV.A. 
 154. See infra Part IV.B. 
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A.  Social Media Evidence Does Not Require Separate Authentication 
Standards 
The court incorrectly concluded that social media evidence re-
quires separate authentication standards.  This conclusion was incor-
rect because, while social media evidence does pose a risk of possible 
manipulation or fraud, this risk is not more present in social media 
evidence than it is in other forms of evidence, electronic or other-
wise.155  Furthermore, the authentication methods suggested by the 
court for social media evidence fit within the existing authentication 
framework, thus there is no need to create a separate process of au-
thentication specifically for this type of evidence.156  Finally, the rules 
of evidence and the common-law precedent for authentication do not 
support the court’s decision to establish a more stringent set of au-
thentication standards solely for social media evidence.157
1.   Social Media Is Not Distinguishable from Other Forms of 
Electronic Communication 
  
The court’s primary grounds for distinguishing social media 
from other forms of electronic evidence was that social media is an 
inherently insecure method of communication that can be easily fa-
bricated.158  While social media significantly changed the landscape of 
online communication, these changes are superficial from an authen-
tication standpoint.159
 
 155. See infra Part IV.A.1. 
  The court’s distinction fails to consider that 
the two methods of fabrication or tampering mentioned by the 
court—“hacking” into a social media account or creating a false ac-
count on behalf of someone else—are at least as easy to accomplish 
with email and chat communication as they are with social media ac-
 156. See infra Part IV.A.2. 
 157. See infra Part IV.A.3. 
 158. Griffin v. State, 419 Md. 343, 361 n.13, 19 A.3d 415, 426 n.13 (2011). 
 159. The major contribution of sites like Facebook, MySpace, Friendster, Google+, Lin-
kedIn, and Twitter has been a new ability to “friend,” “follow,” or “link” with other users to 
share personal, social, and professional information, or pass along an interesting bit of 
news.  While this development has certainly changed with whom and how people commu-
nicate and the topics they communicate about, these social media developments have not 
changed much that would affect the central inquiry of an authentication issue: Is this evi-
dence actually from the person its proponent claims it is?  The question of authorship is 
central to determining the authenticity of any written statement, and as far as authorship is 
concerned the possibility of “fraud or imposition” is not very different in the social media 
context than it is in context of email or any other method of online communication.  This 
is especially true where the security measures to protect email and social media accounts 
are often very similar, if not exactly the same (as is the case with Google’s email and social 
media services).  
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counts because the security of these applications are largely similar.160  
The court found that online chat communication differed from the 
postings on a social networking site because the victim identified the 
distinctive characteristics in the chat records in In re F.P.(references in 
the chat record to the first name of the defendant, personal threats 
made by the defendant, and reference to the high school where the 
children attended) as the reason why he knew with whom he was 
communicating.161  In Griffin, however, the police sergeant who 
printed the MySpace page listed the distinctive characteristics of the 
profile that led him to believe that it belonged to Barber, and these 
characteristics were stipulated to by both parties, though the parties 
disagreed with how these facts affected authenticity.162
The similarities drawn between the nonbinding case law cited by 
the court and the facts of Griffin do not support the court’s finding in 
this case.  While Commonwealth v. Williams and Griffin v. State bear 
some superficial similarities, as both are murder cases with evidence 
from MySpace, the “distinctive characteristics” identified in Griffin—a 
photo of Barber and Griffin, references to the defendant and their 
child, as well as Barber’s birth date, city of residence, and a direct ref-
erence to the case
  
163—are far more significant than the testimony of 
the one witness in Williams, who claimed that the messages she re-
ceived were from the defendant’s brother.164  The facts of People v. Le-
nihan,165
 
 160. For example, compare the account creation procedures at Gmail 
(mail.google.com/mail/signup), Yahoo (new.mail.yahoo.com/addresses), Facebook  
(http://www.facebook.com), and MySpace (https://www.myspace.com/signup), all of 
which require a user name and password to be created and have similar protocols for de-
termining password security.  For a discussion of relative password security, see Dennis 
Guster et al., Weak Password Security: An Empirical Study, 17 INFO. SEC. J.: A GLOBAL 
PERSPECTIVE 45, 45–46 (2008).  The conventional wisdom that average password security is 
weak has been proven to be accurate, regardless of the type of website for which the pass-
word is used.  See Dinei Florêncio & Cormac Herley, A Large-Scale Study of Web Password 
Habits (2007), http://research.microsoft.com/pubs/74164/www2007.pdf (noting that 
users “frequently re-use passwords across multiple sites”).  
 a New York murder case in which the defendant appealed 
because the trial judge refused to allow cross examination based on 
photos from MySpace, are similarly unpersuasive.  Lenihan dealt with 
photographs that, while printed from MySpace, could have been doc-
tored or altered regardless of their source in the manner suggested by 
 161. Griffin, 419 Md. at 361, 19 A.3d at 426 (discussing In re F.P., 878 A.2d 91, 94 (Pa. 
Super. Ct. 2005)).  
 162. Griffin, 419 Md. at 350–51, 19 A.3d at 419.   
 163. Id. at 349, 357, 19 A.3d at 418–19, 424. 
 164. Commonwealth v. Williams, 926 N.E.2d. 1162, 1171–72 (Mass. 2010). 
 165. 911 N.Y.S.2d 588 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2010).  
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the judge in that case.166  United States v. Jackson,167 a wire fraud and 
obstruction of justice case where the defendant was alleged to have 
defrauded the United Parcel Service and racially harassed numerous 
prominent African-Americans, is also not an appropriate or persuasive 
authority in this case because the court discussed the authentication 
issue in dicta as the evidence was not admissible on other grounds.168
Furthermore, in all three cases, the court assumed facts that were 
not presented into evidence in Griffin—the possibility of a user other 
than the owner of the account in Commonwealth v. Williams,
  
169 the 
threat of photo-doctoring in Lenihan,170 and the fraudulent creation 
of web postings in Jackson171—as its basis for finding that the informa-
tion was not authentic.  Even if these facts had been part of the 
record, however, the proper resolution of the discrepancy would have 
been to conditionally admit the evidence and allow the jury to deter-
mine which arguments were more credible.172  In this case, there was 
no information in the record that supported the court’s suggestion 
that the account was fabricated or falsified in some manner.173
Finally, the court ignored several appropriate comparisons when 
it sought to distinguish social media evidence from other forms of 
electronic evidence.  For example, the majority addressed the authen-
tication of emails only in a footnote, stating that “authentica-
tion concerns attendant to e-mails, instant messaging correspon-
dence, and text messages differ significantly from those involving a 
MySpace profile and posting printout, because such correspondence 
is sent directly from one party to an intended recipient or recipients, 
rather than published for all to see.”
 
174  The suggestion that the in-
tended recipient has a bearing on the authenticity of the communica-
tion is not supported by the structure of the rules of evidence, which 
do not limit possible methods of authentication based on the origin 
of the evidence.175
 
 166. Id. at 592.  
  The court failed to consider the fact that the pri-
 167. 208 F.3d 633 (7th Cir. 2000).   
 168. Id. at 635, 637–38. 
 169. 926 N.E.2d at 1172. 
 170. 911 N.Y.S.2d at 592. 
 171. 208 F.3d at 638.  
 172. FED. R. EVID. 104(b); Lorraine v. Markel Am. Ins. Co., 241 F.R.D. 534, 539–40 (D. 
Md. 2007). 
 173. Griffin v. State, 419 Md. 343, 357–58, 19 A.3d 415, 423–24 (2011).  
 174. Id. at 361 n.13, 19 A.3d at 426 n.13. 
 175. See MD. R. 5-901(b) (“By way of illustration only, and not by way of limitation, the fol-
lowing are examples of authentication or identification conforming with the requirements 
of this Rule.”) (emphasis added).  There are rules which allow additional means of au-
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mary risk considered by the court, “manipulation . . . by someone 
other than [the] purported creator and/or user,” is shared equally 
between email and social networking sites.176  There are numerous 
cases dealing with the authentication of emails, and despite almost 
identical security and access mechanisms between the two platforms, 
courts have generally applied the traditional authentication rules, 
without modification, to email authentication questions.177
While the court is correct that text messages are more difficult to 
falsify,
   
178 since they are always associated with a phone number that 
can usually be connected to an owner,179 there still exists the possibili-
ty that a given message could be fraudulent if the phone is shared 
among multiple individuals, stolen, or left unattended—a fact not 
suggested in the consideration of the authentication of text messages 
in Dickens v. State.180  The risk of fraudulent or falsified communica-
tions being presented at trial exists regardless of the medium of 
communication; for example, text messages can be faked, online ac-
counts can be hacked, and signatures can be forged.181  The sugges-
tion that social media and only social media requires a higher level of 
scrutiny reinterprets the rules of evidence in a way that is not consis-
tent with their plain meaning and application.182
 
thentication based on the source of the evidence, but these rules do not limit authentica-
tion of that type of evidence to that method.  See, e.g., MD. R. 5-901(b)(5) (allowing identi-
fication of a voice by a witness who has previously heard the voice “at any time under cir-
cumstances connecting it with the alleged speaker,” without differentiating between public 
and private contexts).  
   
 176. Griffin, 419 Md. at 357, 19 A.3d at 424; see supra note 158 and accompanying text. 
 177. See United States v. Safavian, 435 F. Supp. 2d 36, 38–40 (D.D.C. 2006) (discussing 
the admissibility of emails in a motion in limine prior to a wire fraud and corruption case 
and finding that the emails had been properly authenticated under the Federal Rules of 
Evidence where there were distinctive characteristics, such as email addresses and signa-
tures, for the sender to be identified). 
 178. Griffin, 419 Md. at 361 n.13, 19 A.3d at 426 n.13. 
 179. See Dickens v. State, 175 Md. App. 231, 238, 927 A.2d 32, 36 (2007) (authenticating 
text messages based on the sender’s telephone number). 
 180. 175 Md. App. 231, 238–40, 927 A.2d 32, 36–37 (2007). 
 181. For a recent example of the threat posed by falsification of electronic evidence on 
phone, see Mike Scarcella, Defense Lawyers Seek iPhone 3G in Conspiracy Prosecution, L. TECH. 
NEWS (Jan. 11, 2012), http://www.law.com/jsp/lawtechnologynews/PubArticleFriend-
lyLTN.jsp?id=1202537995906#.  
 182. Lorraine v. Markel Am. Ins. Co., 241 F.R.D. 534, 538 n.5 (D. Md. 2007) (noting 
that the Federal Rules of Evidence “apply to computerized data” and that Rule 102 con-
templated flexibility to address technological developments) (quoting MANUAL FOR 
COMPLEX LITIGATION § 11.447 (4th ed. 2004))). 
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2.  The New Methods of Authentication for Social Media Evidence 
Proposed by the Court Could Be Applied Easily Within Existing 
Authentication Standards 
The Griffin court’s suggested means for the authentication of so-
cial media—testimony from the purported creator, searching the 
computer of the purported creator of the social media account, and 
obtaining information directly from the social networking website—
are valid suggestions for possible methods of authentication.183  The 
rules of evidence do not posit an exclusive list of possible methods for 
authentication.184  Indeed, the methods suggested in Griffin fit well 
within the established guidelines in the rules.  Statements by either 
the purported creator or an individual from the social networking 
website are testimony of a witness with knowledge,185 and any data re-
covered from the purported creator’s computer or the social network-
ing site itself is circumstantial evidence that the evidence is what the 
party presenting the evidence purports it to be.186
Furthermore, the methods outlined by the court are unnecessari-
ly specific and fail to discuss other traditional methods of authentica-
tion that could be sufficient to meet the burden of authentication 
imposed by the rules.
  
187  Testimony from the alleged creator of the 
social media content would certainly be sufficient for authentica-
tion.188
 
 183. Griffin, 419 Md. at 363–65, 19 A.3d at 427–28.  
  In many circumstances, however, testimony from another in-
dividual could be just as valuable, especially where, as in People v. Cle-
venstine and In Re F.P., the individual is familiar with the writing style 
of the alleged creator of the content. Therefore, this individual can 
verify independently that the alleged poster did in fact post the con-
 184. MD. R. 5-901(b) (stating “[b]y way of illustration only, and not by way of limitation, 
the following are examples of authentication or identification conforming with the re-
quirements of this Rule”).  
 185. MD. R. 5-901(b)(1). 
 186. MD. R. 5-901(b)(4).  For a discussion of the use of hash tags and metadata in au-
thentication decisions, see Chief Magistrate Judge Grimm’s discussion in Lorraine, 241 
F.R.D. at 546–48, which explains how data from a computer or website can be used to 
demonstrate the “distinctive characteristics” of the electronic evidence.  
 187. Griffin v. State, 419 Md. 343, 363–64, 19 A.3d 415, 427–28 (2011).  The court notes 
that Griffin should not be read to “suggest that printouts from social networking sites 
should never be admitted,” stating that possible avenues of authentication will “continue 
to develop” and suggesting three “authentication opportunities” for social media evidence.  
Id. at 363, 19 A.3d at 427. 
 188. MD. R. 5-901(b)(1). 
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tent because he witnessed the posting first hand, or the posting is 
consistent with other statements or actions by the poster.189
In addition to testimonial evidence, as the court notes, physical 
evidence could be used to authenticate the posting, whether from the 
website host, Internet service provider, or the hard drive of the com-
puter from which the information was posted.
   
190  This physical evi-
dence could be supplemented or replaced by circumstantial evidence 
surrounding the posting or page, such as photos, other communica-
tions with friends around the same time, non-social media communi-
cations which support the assertion that the poster would have been 
likely to make those comments, or evidence that the postings were in 
fact made from the same physical location.191
3.  The Historical Precedents for Authentication Do Not Support the 
Addition of Restrictive Standards Proposed by the Court 
 
The authentication rules are rooted in common-law precedent 
that allows relatively lax standards to show whether the evidence in 
question is what its proponent claims.192  The standards are purpose-
fully lax because authentication is a threshold issue, and the ultimate 
determination as to the trustworthiness of the evidence is made by the 
jury who decides how much weight to give to the evidence presented 
by the parties.193  A long history of Maryland case law from prior to 
the adoption of the Federal Rules of Evidence supports the treatment 
of authentication as a threshold issue, with only a minimal burden of 
proof required.194  In Lauder v. State,195
 
 189. People v. Clevenstine, 891 N.Y.S.2d. 511, 514 (N.Y. App. Div. 2009), provides an ex-
ample of the value of testimony from individuals other than the creator.  In that case, the 
court found that sexually explicit communications between the defendant and two minor 
children defendant was alleged to have raped was properly authenticated where there was 
testimony from both victims and the defendant’s wife as to the communications at issue.  
Id.  This was also the case in In Re F.P., 878 A.2d 91, 94–95 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2005), in which 
the court found that testimony from the victim stating he had engaged in online commu-
nications with the defendant was properly authenticated where the victim explained that 
the defendant identified himself to the victim, referenced personal interaction between 
the two boys, and mentioned the high school they both attended.  Id.  
 the Court of Appeals allowed a 
price tag, which was not attached to merchandise at the time of trial, 
 190. Griffin, 419 Md. at 363–64, 19 A.3d at 427–28.  
 191. See MD. R. 5-901(b)(4) (stating “[c]ircumstantial evidence, such as appearance, 
contents, substance, internal patterns, location, or other distinctive characteristics” that 
demonstrate the validity of the evidence are acceptable means of authentication).  
 192. See supra Part II.A.1. 
 193. United States v. Nolan, 818 F.2d 1015, 1017 (1st Cir. 1987), overruled on other 
grounds by United States v. Hilton, 363 F.3d 58, 64 (1st Cir. 2004). 
 194. See supra Part II.A.1.  
 195. 233 Md. 142, 144, 195 A.2d 610, 611 (1963). 
  
2012] GRIFFIN v. STATE 87 
to be admitted into evidence as proof of the price of a stolen object 
despite a lack of supporting evidence as to its trustworthiness.196  
Propst v. State,197 which held that writings taken from a person’s home 
are authentic by virtue of the fact that they were recovered from that 
individual without “any further proof of genuineness,” further de-
monstrates the lax authentication standards in Maryland’s common 
law.198
These lax standards have carried forward into the modern era 
and been applied by Maryland courts in cases dealing with electronic 
evidence.
  
199  In both Maryland appellate decisions addressing the ad-
missibility of electronic evidence prior to Griffin, specifically Dickens v. 
State and Carpenter v. State, the Court of Special Appeals reiterated au-
thentication’s role as a threshold issue at trial.200  While this standard 
has not been adopted formally by the Maryland Court of Appeals, 
such a standard has been adopted in federal cases,201 and such a stan-
dard is “almost direct authority impacting our construction of a Mary-
land analog rule.”202  By suggesting that social media evidence exclu-
sively should be subjected to higher standards and limited methods of 
authentication, the court failed to consider the role of the jury in 
judging the relative value of evidence and imposed an unnecessary 
burden on parties seeking to prove the authenticity of social media 
evidence by forcing litigants to follow separate rules for this narrow, 
but increasingly important,203 source of evidence.204
 
 196. Id.  
 
 197. 5 Md. App. 36, 43, 245 A.2d 88, 92 (1968). 
 198. Id.  
 199. See supra Part II.B.1. 
 200. Carpenter v. State, 196 Md. App. 212, 228, 9 A.3d 99, 108 (2010) (reiterating the 
position adopted in Dickens and stating that, where “the jury ‘could infer, legitimately,’ that 
[the defendant] made the calls missed and received by the cell phone,” the evidence was 
admissible at trial); Dickens v. State, 175 Md. App. 231, 239, 927 A.2d 32, 37 (2007) (ana-
logizing to the comparable federal rule, stating that the burden for authentication under 
Federal Rule 901 is “slight”). 
 201. See, e.g., United States v. Safavian, 435 F. Supp. 2d 36, 38 (D.D.C. 2006) (quoting 
United States v. Reilly, 33 F.3d 1396, 1404 (3d Cir. 1994)) (explaining that the standard 
for authentication of evidence at trial is “slight” and intended as a threshold issue). 
 202. Griffin v. State, 419 Md. 343, 365–66, 19 A.3d 415, 428–29 (2011) (Harrell, J., dis-
senting) (citing Higgins v. Barnes, 310 Md. 532, 543, 530 A.2d 724, 729 (1987)).  
 203. For a discussion of the rise of social media evidence in lawsuits, see Michelle Sher-
man, The Anatomy of A Trial With Social Media and the Internet, 11 J. INTERNET L. 1, 9 (2011).  
 204. See Paul W. Grimm et al., Back to the Future: Lorraine v. Markel American Insurance 
Co. and New Findings on the Admissibility of Electronically Stored Evidence, 42 AKRON L. REV. 
357, 366–68 (2009) (discussing the low bar for authentication of evidence at trial, regard-
less of the source of the evidence but noting that “[a]s electronic evidence becomes more 
ubiquitous at trial, it is critical for courts to start demanding that counsel give more in 
terms of authentication”).  
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B.  The Court’s Decision to Exclude the MySpace Post Is Not Supported by 
Existing Rules of Evidence or Traditional Authentication Procedures 
The Griffin court excluded the MySpace printout from evidence 
because the “potential for abuse and manipulation of a social net-
working site by someone other than its purported creator and/or us-
er . . . requires a greater degree of authentication” than was provided 
at trial.205  This holding is not supported by a plain reading of the 
Maryland Rules of Evidence,206 nor does persuasive authority from 
other jurisdictions support such a holding in a manner that comports 
with established evidentiary principles in Maryland.207
1.  A Plain Reading of the Maryland Rules of Evidence Does Not 
Support the Majority’s Holding That the MySpace Printout Was 
Not Properly Authenticated at Trial  
 
The Maryland Rules of Evidence state that “[t]he requirement of 
authentication or identification as a condition precedent to admissi-
bility is satisfied by evidence sufficient to support a finding that the 
matter in question is what its proponent claims.”208  This showing can 
be made through multiple methods.209  In Griffin, the parties stipu-
lated to facts that constituted circumstantial evidence that the posting 
was made by Barber.210  Circumstantial evidence is sufficient for show-
ing evidence authenticity when its “appearance, contents, substance, 
internal patterns, location, or other distinctive characteristics” show 
that “the offered evidence is what it is claimed to be.”211  In this case, 
the parties stipulated that a police sergeant would testify that the 
MySpace page contained a photograph which was recognizably Jessica 
Barber, a date of birth that matched Barber's, the statement “FREE 
BOOZY!!!! JUST REMEMBER SNITCHES GET STITCHES!! U 
KNOW WHO YOU ARE!!," and that Barber is the defendant’s live-in 
fiancée.212
 
 205. Griffin, 419 Md. at 357–58, 19 A.3d at 424 (majority opinion). 
  These identifying and distinctive characteristics are suffi-
cient to meet the minimal burden of authentication required in Mary-
 206. See infra Part IV.B.1. 
 207. See infra Part IV.B.2. 
 208. MD. R. 5-901(a). 
 209. MD. R. 5-901(b). 
 210. Griffin, 419 Md. at 350–51, 19 A.3d at 419–20.  
 211. MD. R. 5-901(b)(4).  
 212. Griffin, 419 Md. at 350–51, 19 A.3d at 419–20. The page also listed the account 
owner’s hometown as “Port Deposit, Maryland,” which is the location Barber gave as her 
home, but that fact was not in the sergeant’s stipulated testimony or presented to the jury.  
Id.  
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land because the circumstantial evidence demonstrates “that the evi-
dence is what it is claimed to be.”213  Indeed, the majority does not 
dispute these facts, but rather assumes facts about the possible “abuse 
and manipulation” of the MySpace posting which were not part of the 
appellate record in this case.214  Even if such evidence of manipula-
tion were offered at trial, the determination of authenticity then 
would become an issue of fact to be decided by the jury under the 
rules for conditional relevance.215  While the Court of Appeals noted 
that it was not asked to consider conditional relevance in this case,216
2.   Persuasive Authority Suggests That the MySpace Printout Was 
Properly Admitted at Trial 
 
it could have ruled sua sponte that conditional relevance was the prop-
er means to resolve this evidentiary discrepancy. 
Federal and state courts that have addressed the admissibility of 
electronic evidence generally have applied the same rules of authen-
tication to the electronic evidence as used for non-electronic evi-
dence.217  In the cases in which the party seeking to introduce the evi-
dence at trial provided supporting facts showing that the offered 
evidence is what it purports to be, courts allowed the evidence to be 
admitted at trial.218
 
 213. MD. R. 5-901(b)(4).   
  Where courts determined that the evidence was 
not properly authenticated, lack of authentication was generally pre-
 214. See Brief for the Petitioner, at 10–20, Griffin v. State, 419 Md. 343, 19 A.3d 415 
(2011) (No. 74), 2010 WL 5096820, at *10–20 (Md. Nov. 4, 2010) (failing to provide spe-
cific evidence that the page was falsified or “hacked,” but stating that the State had not met 
its burden of persuasion and failed to cite evidence in the record that showed or argued 
the page was a fake).   
 215. MD. R. 104(b) (“When the relevance of evidence depends upon the fulfillment of a 
condition of fact, the court shall admit it upon, or subject to, the introduction of evidence 
sufficient to support a finding by the trier of fact that the condition has been fulfilled.”). 
 216.  Griffin, 419 Md. at 365 n.15, 19 A.3d at 428 n.15. 
 217. See, e.g., Lorraine v. Markel Am. Ins. Co., 241 F.R.D. 534, 538 n.5 (D. Md. 2007) 
(explaining that electronic evidence does not require new authentication standards); In Re 
F.P., 878 A.2d 91, 95–96 (Pa. Sup. Ct. 2005) (declining to apply new evidentiary standards 
to electronic evidence). 
 218. See, e.g., Dickens v. State, 175 Md. App. 231, 239, 927 A.2d 32, 37 (2007) (finding 
that text messages admitted at trial were properly authenticated by a showing that the 
phone number belonged to the defendant and that the content of the messages were con-
sistent with the proposition that they were sent by the defendant); People v. Clevenstine, 
891 N.Y.S.2d 511, 514 (N.Y. App. Div. 2009) (finding that authentication standards were 
met as to MySpace chat records in a rape case in which both victims testified that they had 
chatted with the defendant on MySpace, the message records were retrieved from the vic-
tims’ hard drive, a MySpace representative testified that the messages had been exchanged 
on the MySpace network, and the defendant’s wife recalled seeing a sexually explicit mes-
sage when viewing the defendant’s MySpace account). 
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mised on one of two grounds: either the court finding that the evi-
dence was not sufficient to meet the low burden of authentication219 
or the court assuming that the risk of falsification of electronic evi-
dence requires a higher standard of proof from evidence offered 
from such sources.220  The cases premised on falsification risk, howev-
er, do not comport with authentication standards in the Maryland 
Rules of Evidence, which do not provide for higher authentication 
standards based on a higher possibility of falsification.221  The majority 
in Griffin held that the information presented by the prosecution was 
insufficient to meet authentication standards on its own, and further 
ruled that because of the greater risk of “abuse and manipulation” in-
herent in social networking sites, the evidence was not sufficiently au-
thentic.222
V.  CONCLUSION 
  This holding and the subsequent extension of authentica-
tion standards are not supported by the existing rules of evidence and 
common law authentication standards in Maryland. 
In Griffin v. State, the Court of Appeals of Maryland enunciated a 
new standard for the authentication of evidence from social network-
ing websites.223  The court created three authentication methods for 
social networking evidence that are not supported by the existing 
rules of evidence in Maryland.224  Nor is the result in Griffin supported 
by a plain reading of the existing rules of evidence, Maryland case law, 
or persuasive authority from other jurisdictions.225
 
 219. See, e.g., Chaney v. Family Dollar Store of Md., No. 24-C-06-11462 OT, 2007 WL 
5997994, at *1 (Md. Cir. Ct. Dec. 26, 2007) (finding that evidence from a weather website 
was not properly authenticated because it contained no relevant identifying characteristics 
other than a URL printed on the page and no additional “information about the source” 
was provided to the court).  
  The court over-
 220. See State v. Eleck, 23 A.3d 818, 824–25 (Conn. App. Ct. 2011) (finding that messag-
es sent via Facebook were not properly authenticated after citing the inherent risks of falsi-
fication or fraud in online communication); Commonwealth v. Williams, 926 N.E.2d. 
1162, 1171–73 (Mass. 2010) (finding that the authentication of chat records from MySpace 
was insufficient in a murder case because there was no evidence that the owner of the 
MySpace account sent the messages, despite testimony from a witness stating that she knew 
it was the owner of the account who sent the messages). 
 221. MD. R. 5-901(a).  This can be compared to relevancy, for which the rules specifical-
ly define certain types of evidence which is admissible for one purpose and not another.  
See, for example, MD. R. 5-408, which does not allow settlement offers in civil matters to be 
admitted into evidence to prove the validity, invalidity, or amount of civil damages, but 
allows settlement offers to be admitted for other reasons, such as witness bias. 
 222. Griffin v. State, 419 Md. 343, 358, 19 A.3d 415, 424 (2011). 
 223. Id. at 357–58, 363–64, 19 A.3d at 423–24, 427–28. 
 224. See supra Part IV.A and note 134. 
 225. See supra Part IV.B. 
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reached in treating social media evidence as different from other 
forms of evidence and, in so doing, disregarded state and federal 
rules of evidence. 
